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ABSTRACT: As loyal critics of the university whose worldviews furthered key 
existentialist commitments, Octavio Paz and Hazel Barnes advanced philosophies of 
education inspired by the struggles of the 1968 student social protest movements. Their 
appeals to what a complete university education is and ought be demonstrate remarkable 
compatibility given their existentialist affinities and so are relevant to a normative critique of 
the mission of today’s colleges and universities. Both took seriously the idea that the 
university’s didactic mission should include the ideal of cultivating a socially and politically 
desirable, and morally defensible, account of the individual self in action. These thinkers also 
contended that the university should be seen as a place where selves in action rehearse 
engaged moral reflection towards self-fulfillment and social justice across generations. Seen 
against the violence that marred such episodes as the police riots during the Democratic 
Convention in Chicago in August 1968 and the Tlatelolco Massacre in Mexico City weeks 
later, my argument demonstrates how and why the radical normative underpinning of 
Barnes’ and Paz’s philosophies of education offer important guidelines for appraising the 
purposive nature of today’s university. One key outcome of my paper is that it points the way 
towards what I will call a pan-American existentialist philosophy of education that is 
responsive to the generational needs, ideals, and challenges of students today across the 
universities, communities, and nations of the western hemisphere, especially between the 
United States and Mexico. 
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As loyal critics of the university whose worldviews furthered key existentialist 
commitments, Octavio Paz and Hazel Barnes put forward philosophies of education 
that were inspired by the struggles and idealizations of the 1968 student and social 
protest movements. Attuned to the revolts of Blacks and Chicanos in the United 
States, their appeals to what a genuine and complete university education is and ought 
be demonstrate remarkable compatibility given their shared existentialist affinities 
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and are thus eminently relevant to a normative critique of the mission of today’s 
colleges and universities. The national contexts and cultural settings from which these 
thinkers wrote were, of course, different—Barnes was writing in the United States, 
Paz in Mexico. Yet, both took seriously the idea that the university’s didactic mission 
should include the ideal of cultivating a socially and politically desirable, and morally 
defensible, account of the individual self in action. In seeking to concretize relations 
between values and the excogitative space required for thinking them through as a 
foundation for moral and political criticism, these thinkers contended that the 
university should be seen as a place where selves in action rehearse engaged moral 
reflection towards self-fulfillment and social justice across generations. 
 My argument in this essay demonstrates how and why the radical normative 
underpinning of Barnes’ and Paz’s philosophies of education offer important 
guidelines for appraising the purposive nature of today’s university. Three particular 
claims unite these two perspectives; I refer to them as the threefold structure (or 
pyramid) of their affinity. First, their accounts of what an existentialist philosophy of 
education might look like are framed in terms of the normative proposition that any 
meaningful diagnosis of the conditions suffered by today’s university and its 
members should be centered on the question of values. Second, both believed that the 
rehearsal or practice of values at the university provides the necessary experience of 
circumstances needed for maintaining robust deliberative democratic practice. Third, 
their manner of linking values to lived experience as the bedrock for moral criticism 
is relevant to the life projects and community relations of all human beings—across 
borders, throughout the hemisphere, and around the world. Hence these guidelines 
give direction to selves in action (i.e., social actors or moral agents) for developing 
criticism from within multidimensional, ever-changing, and transnational contexts. 
These guidelines also offer a public and philosophical measure for assessing how far a 
society has gone in terms of articulating, engaging, and realizing its professed values 
and ideals. 
Seen against the violence that marred such episodes as the police riots during the 
Democratic Convention in Chicago in August 1968 and the Tlatelolco Massacre in 
Mexico City weeks later, the existentialist philosophies of education proposed by 
Barnes and Paz offer models that are helpful towards assessing the extremes of 
student activism on campuses today. Indeed, among the most pressing issues facing 
teachers, students, and activists today is where to nurture a collective loyalty to those 
values and actors affected by and operating not just within institutions of higher 
education, but also throughout the body politic and society at large. Consequently, 
given that the broad contours of these critical methodologies are framed by an 
evaluation of the meaning of a university education, the mission of the university, and 
a defense of student protest, one key outcome of my paper is that it points the way 
towards what I will call a pan-American existentialist philosophy of education that is 
responsive to the generational needs, ideals, and challenges of students today across 
the social differences and national borders of the peoples and countries of the 
Americas, i.e., across the universities, communities, and nations of the western 
hemisphere, especially between the United States and Mexico. 
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Three consequences follow from the existentialist philosophies of education I will 
examine in this essay. The first is that the significance of a university education 
should be based on exposing students to the importance of moral values in general 
and to the value of criticism in particular. This moral criticism is of personal, social, 
and political significance. Practice in the art or skill of moral criticism should be the 
centerpiece of any university’s mission, especially given the pledge of a liberal arts 
education to individual student growth. The second outcome is based on the 
observation that both figures saw the university as a place where social, political and 
moral criticism (including personal or self-criticism) gets practiced, played out, and 
rehearsed. This distinction between criticism of one’s own personal self and criticism 
of sociopolitical institutions and others sets the university apart as a place where 
values are, in a sense, practiced or played out (exercised, stretched, conditioned), 
thereby making institutions of higher education unlike any other in the contemporary 
world. However, the third outcome is predicated on the first two consequences and 
provides a key contrast between their outlooks. The most critical difference between 
the accounts of Barnes and Paz on these matters can be summarized by stating that 
while both viewed the university as a community as well as a uniquely creative place 
where students gain exposure to different modes or forms of criticism, they disagreed 
about what was perhaps the most important or distinctive feature of a university 
education. Paz will focus on what he calls the paradox of distance in order to 
emphasize that criticism in any form is dependent upon students being able to see 
their own relationship to society as the condition of their thought. Barnes, on the other 
hand, will view this basic groundwork of criticism (of self criticism as much as moral 
criticism) as the basis for claiming that what this exposure to criticism at the 
university level ultimately provides students is the basic framework for developing 
what she calls an art of living. 
Together, these two glosses constitute what I am calling the twin directions of 
moral criticism (personal and sociopolitical), both of which are only possible because, 
in the university Barnes called the privilege of sanctuary, and at the college of Paz, 
“the university is at once the object and the condition of student criticism” (Paz 1985, 
223). Barnes’ indirectly alludes to one way in which thinking through an art of living 
requires understanding the relation of distance between the university and society: 
“classroom discussions of social theories and of the moral dilemmas of literary heroes 
and heroines were fore-runners of the teach-ins on Vietnam and Civil 
Rights…questions of ethical responsibility have not been strangers in classes and 
humanities and the social sciences” (Barnes 1970, 26-27). The distance between the 
university and the community at large is the necessary space from which criticism in 
any form becomes possible. Thus, like an art of living, the paradox of distance 
emerges in the creative and deliberative space between the life of university students 
and the society at large from which their lives as university students are removed; in 
this space also emerges a viable philosophy of life. Both the paradox of distance and 
the art of living therefore call attention to Barnes’ and Paz’s social, political, and 
moral defense of the student protests of 1968 and so tightens the existentialist and 
pan-American tether of their philosophies of education. 
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The pan-American existentialist philosophy of education I will gesture towards in 
this essay aims to contribute to the growing body of literature on Latin American 
philosophy, adding in particular a study of the existentialist underpinnings of North 
American and Latin American engagements of social protest movements, the 
foundations of moral criticism, and the social and political value and significance of a 
university education. This perspective occasions the claim that perhaps future 
relations between the peoples and countries of the western hemisphere might come to 
be seen as related in a way that emphasizes the place of individuals in society and the 
need for each new generation to critically engage the social, political, and moral 
realities of their communities in order to make them more their own. My conclusion 
suggests that a pan-American existentialist philosophy of education provides a 
foundation for building bridges of solidarity across the borders and boundaries of life 
as it is lived, known, and studied across the Americas. 
 
1. REBEL BEATNIKS AND STUDENT ACTIVISTS: 
  BARNES ON EDUCATION IN THE ART OF LIVING  
 
In 1950, Hazel Estelle Barnes taught the first course offered in North America on 
Existentialism at the University of Toledo (Cannon 2008, 92). In an editorial written 
for that university’s student newspaper the Collegian (found in the University of 
Toledo Archives) in March that same year, Barnes lamented that the American 
educational system reinforced the disturbing cultural practice whereby citizens 
“undersell” themselves and students have “far more desire to be laughed at as stupid 
than damned as a serious student” (Barnes 1950, 1). Barnes would revisit these 
themes of American anti-intellectualism, obscurantism, and deteriorating educational 
standards time and again throughout her distinguished academic career. Her obvious 
disappointment would echo in a book chapter entitled “Existentialism and 
Education,” written seventeen years later, where she claims that “there is a great 
paradox in American education” and, in her opinion, “it would be fair to say that most 
American children receive absolutely nothing of what can in any significant sense be 
called education in ethics” (Barnes 1967, 292). In her autobiography published in 
1997, she doubts “that it is possible to teach anything, even basic science or a skill, 
without transmitting something of one’s own values” (Barnes 1997, 219). 
Unsurprisingly, Barnes’ passion for education characterizes how she is remembered 
by her closest friends, who recall Barnes as taking seriously the responsibility for 
“putting into practice her avowed intentions and values” (Cannon 2008, 96). 
Barnes’ personal values were apparently indistinguishable from the sociopolitical 
standards and ideals of human conduct she hoped to impart to her students through 
her teaching and, through her publications, to the philosophical community at large. 
Prior to becoming known as the translator of Sartre’s Being and Nothingness 
(originally published in France in 1943, first English translation published in 1956; 
See Anne Sophie-Cohen 1989, 188; Barnes 1997, 150), Barnes’ burgeoning 
scholarship delved into Sartre’s account of the living, concrete individual, especially 
the paradoxes he thought shaped the lived experience of existing human beings (See 
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Barnes 1956, “Jean-Paul Sartre and the Haunted Self”). Barnes’ early work also 
examined questions of self-realization in the work of Albert Camus, whose work she 
interpreted along Aristotelian lines (See, for example, Barnes 1960, “Balance and 
Tension in the Philosophy of Camus”). 
 In The University as the New Church (1970), Barnes outlines a normative 
existentialist critique of “the University as it is and as it might be” (Barnes 1970, vii). 
Comparing the university of today with the church of yesterday, Barnes observes that 
“the similarity of the situations in which University and Church now find themselves 
suggests that in their fundamental nature there must be some common likeness” 
(Barnes 1970, 2). Barnes then claims that questions of self-knowledge, personal 
identity, and seriousness (i.e., maturity, or the ability to face difficult challenges or 
recognize the gravity of situations, etc.), in addition to the acquired ability to critically 
evaluate one’s moral standing, comprise the core ethical values, principles, and ideals 
imparted by a university education, including religious universities. This orientation 
leads her to assert that the university (not unlike the church) seeks to accomplish three 
distinct goals: “to point out the path to truth, to instruct the young, to guide man 
toward the good life” (Barnes 1970, 2). Seen along these lines, the existentialist 
dimensions of Barnes’ critique of the university (and the church) frame her sense of 
the importance of developing one’s personal and sociopolitical priorities and rules of 
conduct towards what she broadly construes as moral criticism. As such, Barnes work 
addresses the relationship between what she calls “our basic way of life” and the 
values that underwrite personal and well as sociopolitical criticism (moral criticism) 
across generational difference. 
 Among the most fundamental lessons Barnes believes any meaningful university 
education teaches stems from her insight, I think, that values are in a theatrical as 
much as a moral sense rehearsed (produced, staged, performed, deconstructed, etc.) 
at the university. To rehearse values means to test principles, viewpoints, and 
consequences through the exchange and sometimes conflict of ideals that lies at the 
heart of ethical and deliberative discourse. At the university, values are not just 
examined but also practiced or played-out (exercised, stretched, conditioned) in a 
setting where participant members contribute thoughtfully and genuinely (one also 
hopes sincerely) to the pressing issues of the contemporary world through critical 
engagement with the examples, ideas, and experiences under consideration—under 
production, as it were. Through the staging and rehearsal of scenarios based on the 
dialogues of fictional and non-fictional narratives, then, a university education 
produces momentous ideas about the world of human experience, and these ideas, 
once rehearsed, bracket the core values that shape our thinking about the world and so 
help us to determine how we might act. (Philosophy in particular produces ideas 
about ideas. We might call this production of ideas about ideas the supreme value of 
the university mission—to study, produce, and evaluate ideas that inform our lived 
experience.) Rehearsing values thus means exchanging ideas and reaching 
conclusions about how one should live her life and what one should ultimately care 
about in life. Rehearsing values also means having a tentative sense of direction 
mapped out (staged) for the imminent performance. None of this suggests that one 
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forgets that the map might have to be improvised and redrawn at a moment’s notice 
should the staging or rehearsed plan of action fall apart. The suggestion does arise 
however that the traditional view of the value of a liberal arts education as being 
predicated upon the claim of knowledge for its own sake might need to be 
downgraded to focus on the practical philosophy required for living a meaningful and 
fulfilling existence.   
Not everyone is cut out for acting, of course. Similarly, not everyone benefits 
from nor is meant for a liberal arts education. This is only to say that students 
fortunate enough to attend the university enjoy a moral opportunity not universally 
shared by the larger portion of society’s members. Barnes doubtless anticipated this 
singular privilege, for she frames this mark of differentiability in terms that restate the 
importance of rehearsing values at the university as a generational practice towards 
engaging personal and sociopolitical realities faced later in life. She observes, “For 
the most part in contemporary culture there is no built-in plan whereby no person may 
come of age without having been exposed to thoughtful discussions of personal value 
systems and social responsibilities” (Barnes 1970, 13). This quote provides a key 
instance where Barnes’ claims about the importance of moral criticism underscores 
her purported sense of the mission of the university. Barnes’ focus is not on isolated 
conclusions one reaches in college (like the question about whether or not to support 
war; to accept the belief in God, or if polyamory is more desirable than marriage, and 
so on). Instead, her focus is on the structure of relations between individuals and the 
society into which they enter as educated and experienced moral agents facing a 
world of mixed, multifarious, and unpredictable conflict. This quote also 
demonstrates the assumed importance that an open future plays in terms of framing 
Barnes’ discussion of “personal value systems and social responsibilities,” or what I 
have been calling the personal, social, and political consequences of moral criticism. 
Granted that the working out or practice of values at the university is an 
opportunity we might all benefit from (Barnes seems to think that everyone should 
benefit from such practice), relatively few members of society ever get a chance to 
rehearse (without consequence or the threat of punishment) their personal and 
sociopolitical commitments. This reality further distances the unique moral 
worldviews students seen as social actors/moral agents acquire through a university 
education that sets them apart from the rest of a given community’s members. (United 
States Census data indicates that roughly 1 in 4 Americans has a baccalaureate 
college degree.) The peculiar advantage of being a college student is not free from its 
own limitations. The problem Barnes sees with the university in the late 1960s is that 
“under the guise of detachment and non-commitment, the University has been 
handling the problems of values surreptitiously and performing its religious duties 
badly. It has become a Church without ever clearly formulating its faith or seriously 
examining the worth of its plan for salvation” (Barnes 1970, 19). The language of 
formulating a faith rests within the domain of ethics, while “seriously examining the 
worth of its plan” underscores the importance of education.   
What begins to appear at this point is an outline, on the one hand, of Barnes’ 
broader concern with what an existentialist philosophy of education might look like, 
 
 
 
Comparative Philosophy 6.1 (2015)  KAISER ORTIZ 
44 
with the weightier question of what an existentialist ethics might look like, on the 
other. Hanging in the balance between both views is the issue whether and how a 
university education teaches us how to think and act, and how a university education 
therefore relates to the tenets of both moral purviews. Barnes is unambiguously clear 
about the underlying value of the relationship between ethics and education: “the 
underlying faith of the University in its own mission should rest simply on the 
conviction that all men and women are worth saving” (Barnes 1970, 191). Clearly, a 
concern with individual redemption furnishes one of the primary goals Barnes 
believes should be the focus of a university’s mission. From the relationship between 
ethics and education then emerges the topmost personal value and engaged social 
ideal of an open future, or the idea that the individual selves in action who represent 
each new generation can determine for themselves and on their own terms which 
primary values (and commitments) should govern their deliberations and decision-
making as mature and responsible social actors/moral agents. Consequently, Barnes, 
like Paz, holds a critical view of the reality of higher education in the sense that those 
drafted to fight (and die fighting) the war in Viet Nam were not even granted an 
audition for this theater of possibility and so will not get a chance to be actors on the 
stage of world history. 
Barnes’ philosophy of education, whatever its historical, present, and ongoing 
dilemmas, is based on the belief that the university is and should be a safe place or 
neutral ground, a kind of moral rehearsal studio where the burgeoning leaders and 
inchoate visionaries of the next generation can work out their ideas among similarly 
responsible and committed individuals. This is why she claims that “whatever we 
may think of what student protestors propose for the future, they are right in thinking 
that in the University rests the best, perhaps the only, hope of initiating significant 
changes in the life of man” (Barnes 1970, 19). But where would such a project begin, 
and towards what end would these changes be directed? Barnes’ hope for the positive 
transformative role a university can play towards achieving virtuous and just realities 
is optimistic. After all, the question of evaluating the true mission of the university 
involves asking how might we go about initiating significant changes in the life of 
individual selves in action across generations. Unfortunately, however, Barnes is not 
as forthcoming in her response to such questions as we might expect. Nevertheless, 
one answer we might venture to give to such an important question could involve 
demonstrating that this transformative project is strengthened and concretized at the 
level of higher education. One might further claim in response that an education 
suitably focused on values will eventually lead to a more robust sense of the vital 
importance of moral criticism for social actors/moral agents who value personal and 
sociopolitical flourishing, i.e, a healthy deliberative democracy. Both of these 
potential responses are, in any case, suggested by the conjoining of existentialist 
principles with a philosophy of education. As a bridge between her existentialist 
ethics and her philosophy of education, it is telling that Barnes wrote The University 
as the New Church (1970) three years after developing her rendering of a Sartrean 
ethics in An Existentialist Ethics (1967). 
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Barnes repeatedly sought to demonstrate in her own writings what an 
existentialist ethics might look like, practically and theoretically. Barnes’ account of 
the moral life was distinguished from but still partly based on what she thought 
Sartre’s ethics might entail. Sartre, we remember, had promised but never delivered 
his work on ethics. Nevertheless, Barnes claims that “ethical concerns are implied in 
all of his works” (Barnes 1997, 147). She credits Sartre with having “developed the 
idea (or, if ‘developed’ is too strong a word, he suggested it) that if we want to live 
authentically—i.e., consistently with the truth of our human condition—we must 
individually create our own ethics, that since we are responsible for the selves we 
have made and are making, we must answer for them, at least to ourselves” (Barnes 
1997, 147). Barnes ultimately viewed her own attempt at formulating an existentialist 
ethics “a feeble effort…that glaringly demonstrates the gap between intention and 
achievement” (Barnes 1997, 147). And yet, although Barnes may have viewed her 
own interpretation of an existentialist ethics with suspicion, it was clear to her that 
“implicit in [Sartre’s] declaration that in choosing for ourselves, we choose for 
humankind, I heard the plea for the need to develop collectively an ethics appropriate 
to all of humanity that would not violate individuals’ freedom to establish their own 
value systems” (Barnes 1997, 147). Barnes would never doubt that an existentialist 
philosophy of education could help foster a meaningful system of personal values that 
compel one to negotiate the larger communities to which one belongs, even if such an 
education might fall short of developing a complete or systematic ethics for every 
student passing through the hallowed halls of academe. 
In spite of these limitations, An Existentialist Ethics (1967) deserves more credit 
than Barnes gives it. Readers familiar with this work will recall that the view of ethics 
(the moral framework) she develops in this work begins from a cultural and 
psychological portrait of social rebels in American society: beatnik poets, social 
organizers, political activists, new radicals, and Norman Mailer. By positing as 
central to any understanding of the human condition two fundamental, yet opposite 
extremes of lived experience as chronic boredom versus intense living, Barnes 
defends her belief that existentialism is uniquely positioned to respond to the 
humanistic desires and moral demands of the coming-of-age generation of the middle 
twentieth century. 
 
The teacher should try to teach what we may unabashedly call the art of living; like any 
instructor in the arts, he or she must have practiced that art personally and be able to 
communicate the fruits of experience while remembering that the aim is to enable the 
child to develop his own talents and not merely to imitate (Barnes 1970, 182). 
 
The art of living becomes, then, the enduring priority of what I have been calling 
moral criticism, both in its personal and sociopolitical manifestations. Barnes’ 
outlook echoes the philosophy of education voiced by William James, under whose 
influence Barnes claims she was raised. In Talks to Teachers on Psychology (1899), 
James described the ideal of education as “the organization of acquired habits of 
conduct and tendencies to behavior” (James 1958, 37). Barnes, speaking directly to 
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the influence of the 1960s student and social protest movements on her thinking about 
ethics and education, and as evidence of James’ influence on Barnes’ thinking about 
the art of living, remarks “that our basic way of life will have to be radically modified 
in the face of the ecological crisis” (Barnes 1967, vix). Doubtless this crisis has 
worsened in the nearly half-century since these two works were published. Barnes 
proposes that an existentialist philosophy of education that values responsibility, 
moral criticism, and an open future are spelled out and so can collectively stand for “a 
humanistic existentialist ethics [that] is peculiarly well suited to deal with the 
conflicting demands of a society in transition” (Barnes 1967, vix). 
The supreme value Barnes idealizes through her existentialist philosophy of 
education is love. Through love, Barnes’ is able to emphasize the transformative 
social role educated individuals might have on the society into which they enter after 
graduation. As Barnes describes it, “love is the value offered as the bridge between 
the individual and society or, if your prefer, as the cement which can hold people so 
closely together that whatever is conceived as good for the whole will automatically 
include the legitimate needs of the individual” (Barnes 1970, 161). Love for Barnes is 
a moral antidote to prevailing forms of oppression, e.g. elitism and inequality in their 
endless mutations, which explains why she claims that, “by stressing the ideals of 
service and self-fulfilment (sic) rather than social approval and material success, we 
may gradually rub out the scars of centuries of elitism” (Barnes 1970, 179). Seen in 
this way, Barnes’ existentialist philosophy of education shows itself as moral 
criticism, e.g., as an art of living, that may also take equality as a serious personal and 
sociopolitical priority or commitment. As evidence of this claim, Barnes points out 
that “love reminds us that reverence for the need of every individual is the sole 
support of human solidarity” (Barnes 1970, 190). Consequently, the practices 
valorized by a university education come to reflect the values of individual selves in 
action; likewise, the rehearsal of values like love becomes the foundation for a 
healthy, thriving body politic. 
As I will show in the next section, Barnes’ focus on values and her elevation of 
the human search for meaning in “the privilege of sanctuary” (Barnes 1970, 3) can be 
seen as related to Paz’s critique of the university’s peculiar mission and its 
instrumental role in fostering and maintaining democratic vitality, e.g., the exchange 
of viewpoints and ideas necessary for living in a peaceful society. Barnes’ critique 
provides an illustration of the kind of criticism Paz proposes, one couched in terms of 
a clearly normative evaluation of the purpose or mission of a university. By the same 
token, Paz adds to Barnes’ existentialist philosophy of education a more rigorously 
articulated account of and politically deeper engagement with moral criticism and its 
centrality in the university. 
 
2. PAZ ON MORAL CRITICISM AND THE VIOLENCE  
AGAINST STUDENT PROTEST 
 
The philosophic thought of Octavio Paz is imbued with existentialism of the post-war 
Parisian years, during a period Paz calls the “high noon of [Sartre’s] glory and 
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influence” (Paz 1992, 36). One could argue (as I have elsewhere; see Kaiser Ortiz 
2012) that Paz’s thought not only epitomizes existentialism in Mexico but also moves 
critically beyond the accounts of solitude, love, and freedom developed by his 
contemporaries, including Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre, whom Paz met 
(and later wrote on) while living in Paris between 1948-1950 working for the 
Mexican foreign service. Perhaps the most concrete evidence of Paz’s abiding 
commitment to feminist criticism alongside his articulations and expressions of 
existentialist philosophical concerns like the problem of solitude is to be found in his 
wholesale adoption of Beauvoirs’ account of women as being not born but rather 
becoming themselves—particularly in Mexico, as is his adopted viewpoint 
throughout The Labyrinth of Solitude. Indeed, Paz’s most famous essay The 
Labyrinth of Solitude was written while he was living in Paris immediately after the 
second world war.  What can be called Paz’s critique of modernity is in many ways a 
pan-American critique of North American and European existentialism. 
The Other Mexico (1970) is a three-part essay based on the Hackett Memorial 
lectures Paz gave at the University of Texas at Austin on 30 October 1969. This essay 
was written as a denunciation of the Mexican government’s blood-spilling orgy in 
Mexico City’s Plaza de Tres Culturas, an episode more commonly known as the 
Tlatelolco Massacre when hundreds of protesting students were executed en masse by 
members of the Batallón Olimpia, an elite division of the Mexican military—just ten 
days before the start of the Olympics in Mexico City, the first time the prestigious 
sports event was sponsored in a developing nation. Paz was so deeply moved by these 
student demonstrations that he joined them. After the slaughter on 2 October 1968, 
Paz resigned his diplomatic post as Mexico’s ambassador to India. Enrique Krauze 
would later call this act “his finest hour, an unheard-of gesture in Mexico” that 
“founded a culture of intellectual dissidence in Mexico” and throughout Latin 
America (Krauze 1998). In this essay, written one year later, Paz distances himself 
from questions of national identity he had explored earlier in The Labyrinth of 
Solitude (1950), focusing now on the socio-political necessity of moral criticism for 
attaining democratic institutions and practices. 
The two features of Paz’s philosophy of education I develop in this section focus 
on his remarks on the social-political distance of the university and the requirement of 
moral criticism for furthering, advancing, and ensuring democratic development. Paz 
enlarges the account of moral criticism Barnes offers (personal criticism of oneself 
and social-political criticism of institutions and others) to focus not simply on 
cultivating the art of living (although Paz clearly thinks this is one part of a 
meaningful education), but on developing democratic institutions and practices. Paz 
thus defends the criticism that the Mexican studentry embodies and the university as 
an institution represents. In the context of Tlatelolco, the Mexican government’s 
publicly grotesque, murderous aggression against its own citizens dramatizes Paz’s 
insight into the social and political relevance, and moral purpose, of a university 
education. The fact that these Mexican students were murdered by their own 
government adds urgency to Paz’s ideas on education that is not as pronounced in 
Barnes, even though her Preface to The University as the New Church was written in 
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May 1970, the same month in which the Kent State University Massacre (4 May 
1970) took place, killing four students and wounding nine in Ohio. 
For Paz, the university constitutes an immersive theater of discourse shaped by its 
physical removal and psychological distance from the social and political realities to 
which the university community is connected. This distance is necessary, Paz thinks, 
in order to foster critical thinking about the same society from which student life is 
separated. In “Olympics and Tlatelolco,” the first of three sections that comprise The 
Other Mexico, Paz discusses how “of all the disaffected sectors, that of the students is 
the most restless and, with the exception of the North American blacks, the most 
exasperated” (Paz 1985, 222). The reason for this edginess and impatience is that 
 
their exasperation does not spring from particularly hard living conditions but from the 
paradox that being a student entails: during the long years in which young men and 
women are isolated in schools of higher education, they live under artificial conditions, 
half as privileged recluses, half as dangerous irresponsibles (Paz 1985, 222).   
 
Paz’s claim about artificial conditions mirrors Barnes’ general outlook, as when 
she writes, “the University has attempted to prolong the adolescence of students, in 
effect asking them to study now and live later” (Barnes 1985, 27). This notion of 
postponing instruction in the art of living means that the paradox of distance becomes 
a hindrance for the artful living Barnes proposed. Paz’s account of moral criticism 
relates to his regard for the university not in terms of any mission per se, but rather on 
the physical separation and de facto segregation of students from the society to which 
their criticism is directed. 
Paz’s clearest statement of a philosophy of education emerges from his sense of 
how criticism materializes and becomes real for university students. “The university 
is at once the object and the condition of student criticism” (Paz 1985, 223). Paz 
substantiates his characterization of criticism in a manner that bears out quintessential 
existentialist motifs. 
 
It is the object of their criticism because it is an institution that segregates the young from 
the collective life and is thus, in a way, an anticipation of their future alienation.  They 
discover that men are fragmented and separated by modern society: the system, by its 
very nature, cannot create a true community.  And it is the condition of the criticism 
because, without the distance that the university establishes between the young and the 
society outside, their criticism would not be possible and the students would immediately 
enter into the mechanical cycle of production and consumption. The contradiction is 
irresolvable (Paz 1985, 223). 
 
While Paz might here appear (misleadingly, I think) to have a fatalistic attitude about 
the moral significance of a university education, it is apparent that Paz sees university 
students not just in Mexico but also around the world in 1968 as members of an 
emergent collective, universal human identity. Paz denounces the carnage of 
Tlatelolco as an unconscionable assault on the moral potentialities promised by 
universal human identity, a relationship directly tied to his interest in students of the 
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period who saw their national struggles in terms of solidarity with students elsewhere. 
Significantly, “the universality of youthful protest has not prevented it from assuming 
specific characteristics in each region of the world” (Paz 1985, 227). Paz’s caveat in 
his epigraphic “note” reiterates his concern not just with Mexican-ness 
(Mexicanidad), but also with universal human identity. In his words, “Mexican-ness 
is no more than another example, another variety, of that changing, identical, single, 
plural creature that each is, all are, none is.  Man/men: perpetual oscillation. The 
diversity of characters, temperaments, histories, civilizations makes of man, men. 
And the plural is resolved, is dissolved, in the singular: I, you, he, vanishing as soon 
as pronounced” (Paz 1985, 216). In these passages, Paz can be seen to relate the value 
of a university education to the collective generational emergence of universal human 
identity. 
Although my focus in The Other Mexico is confined to “Olympics and 
Tlatelolco,” since it is here where Paz locates his discussion of university education 
and the role of criticism in it, it is worth noting that in the other two sections of his 
essay, Paz lambasts the idea of progress as it gets experienced differently in North 
American and Europe, as compared with Mexico and Latin America. Paz is certainly 
suspicious, if not hostile to the idea of progress. And yet, this criticism serves as the 
broader backdrop against which his ideas on criticism leading to social, political, and 
moral development are played out. In the second section of The Other Mexico, for 
example, “Development and Other Mirages,” Paz’s stretches the connection between 
moral criticism and the development of democratic institutions and practices. He 
writes, “above all and before all else: we must conceive viable models of 
development, models less inhuman, costly, and senseless than those we have now” 
(Paz 1985, 283). Interestingly, even though Paz is suspicious of the developmental 
course Mexican history has taken, especially in the twentieth century, his critique of 
development as it pertains to North America’s political economy strategically targets 
the big business of war-mongering and war-making. Paz is therefore extremely 
cautious about the extent to which moral criticism as it is practiced in the United 
States translates once it has made it across the Mexican border. In Paz’s words, “the 
fusion of the state and what the North Americans call ‘the military-industrial 
complex’ is one of the most disquieting aspects of the evolution of the capitalist 
countries” (Paz 1985, 281). In this way, Paz seems to identify brutal government 
repression in Mexico as predicated, at the very least influenced by, the desire of 
developing nations to ape the models of political economy evidenced in the United 
States and Europe. 
In the third section of The Other Mexico, “Critique of the Pyramid,” Paz claims 
that Tlatelolco “was simultaneously a negation of what we have wanted to be since 
the Revolution and an affirmation of what we have been since the Conquest and even 
earlier” (Paz 1985, 290). Paz’s point is that Mexico and Latin America are faced with 
radically different social circumstances and limitations than life in more advanced 
countries. Thus framing Paz’s sense of the importance of moral criticism is the 
question concerning whether and how we can understand our relations to the world, 
our selves, and others in such a way that “we devise more human models that 
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correspond to what we are” (Paz 1985, 217-8). Although the context for Paz’s insight 
here is Mexico’s relationship to both Latin America and the United States, the sense 
of moral criticism that emerges from his essay initially gets expressed as the claim 
that “the question of ourselves always turns out to be a question of others” (Paz 1985, 
218); this claim is soon expanded to signify that “criticism of others begins with 
criticism of oneself” (Paz 1985, 220). 
The Other Mexico engages moral criticism of the structural realities and felt 
experiences facing Mexicans and, by implication, all human beings in late modernity.  
Paz’s emphasis on the university mission, the values of education, and the moral 
direction of future generations constitute symbolism. Framed in terms of what he 
calls modernity’s moral failure, Paz asks: “can we plan a society that is not based on 
the domination of others and that will not end up like the chilling police paradises of 
the East or with the explosions of disgust and hatred that disrupt the banquet of the 
West?” (Paz 1985, 218). He goes on to explain that “the question of Mexico is 
inseparable from that question of Latin America’s future, and this, in turn, in included 
in another: that of the future relations between Latin America and the United States” 
(Paz 1985, 218). 
Paz’s pursuit of criticism furnishes the clearest expression of his commitment to 
existentialist principles, precepts, and practices. “Criticism,“ he writes, “unfolds the 
possibility of freedom and is thus an invitation to action” (Paz 1985, 216). 
Significantly, it is Paz’s use of this definition that most clearly demonstrates why he 
thinks Mexico in addition to Latin American countries need to teach nascent 
generations of university students the importance and value of criticism for sustaining 
the development of democratic institutions and practices, including the open and 
unencumbered exchange of ideas that characterizes healthy, robust deliberative 
democracies. After all, “the theme of development is intimately linked to that of our 
identity: who, what, and how we are,” writes Paz (Paz 1985, 218). 
Like Barnes, criticism of social, political, and moral realities was also Paz’s 
lifelong concern. The Other Mexico is no exception, and “is a reflection upon what 
has taken place in Mexico since…The Labyrinth of Solitude,” twenty years earlier.  
Referring to this previous work (Labyrinth) as “an exercise of the critical 
imagination,” Paz dubs this newer investigation “a critical and self-critical 
continuation” (Paz 1985, 215). Although Paz purports an interest in distancing 
himself from the achievements (and controversies) of Labyrinth, he nonetheless 
grants their relation to his present essay: “in those days (i.e., when Labyrinth was 
written) I was not interested in a definition of Mexican-ness but rather, as now, in 
criticism: that activity which consists not only in knowing ourselves but, just as much 
or more, in freeing ourselves” (Paz 1985, 216). 
To summarize, Barnes’ idea that both education in general and the mission of the 
liberal arts university in particular should teach the art of living resonates with Paz’s 
sense of the importance of moral criticism. The existentialist concern with relations 
between the self and others is constitutive for both authors of what should be the 
proper focus of a university education. But in contrast to Barnes’ idea that an art of 
living stands for the value or worth of a liberal arts education, Paz’s ideal for 
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education appears to be focused on the ability of students in Mexico to criticize and 
directly challenge the authoritarian control the Partido Revolucionario Institucional 
(PRI) had over life and thought in Mexico. 1  Paz’s philosophy of education 
complements Barnes’ account in absolute terms: the art of living runs up against 
unforgiving, if not deadly limits when a government is prepared to kill you for 
criticism against it. 
 
3. THIS IS WHAT AN EXISTENTIALIST,  
PAN-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION LOOKS LIKE 
 
Barnes and Paz shared a philosophical and pedagogical commitment to a liberal arts 
education because it provides a worldview selves in action might adopt in order to 
advance their personal growth and flourishing. Simply put, they take the generational 
transformation of social, political, and moral realities—including ideas about these 
realities—seriously. Paz speaks to this point early in The Other Mexico. “If Latin 
America is living through a period of revolts and transformations,” he writes, “the 
United States is also experiencing an upheaval no less violent and profound: the 
rebellion of Blacks and Chicanos, of women and the young, of artists and 
intellectuals” (Paz 1985, 219). In the context of a philosophy of education, Paz’s 
witness suggests that if a university education provides one half of the moral measure 
for assessing the health of society, then the other half of this measure is found in the 
degree to which students entering these various worlds of social, political, and moral 
responsibility after college are able to exercise their accumulated practice and apply it 
in publicly redeeming ways. But how and in what manner such values are honed, 
refined, scrutinized, enacted, and studied in the public domain depends on the 
circumstances and persons according to which such ideas were rehearsed—prior to 
being staged and performed. 
Paz discusses social change (Barnes does, too) when he delineates the social, 
political, and moral differences distinguishing life and thought between Mexico and 
the United States. As he sees it, “the causes that originate and the ideas that inspire 
these upheavals make them different from those that agitate our own countries, and 
therefore we would be committing a new error if we attempted to imitate them 
blindly” (Paz 1985, 219). While this statement is doubtless a reference to the history 
of positivism and its aftermath in Mexico, Paz’s assertion that “it would be not be an 
error to take note of the capacity for criticism and self-criticism that is unfolding 
within them” both encourages an exploration of his purported relevance to and 
intersections with existentialism and the philosophy of education given to us by 
Barnes.2  After all, Paz clearly believes that “the capacity for criticism and self-
                                                
1 The Partido Revolucionario Institucional, or PRI, was Mexico’s dominant political party for 71 years 
whose putative dictatorship held a grip over all facets of social, political, and moral life in Mexico.  
The PRI recaptured the Mexican Presidency in 2012 with the election of Enrique Peña Nieto. 
2 See Leopoldo Zea’s Positivism in Mexico for a broad account of educational ideals, policies, and 
goals in Mexico during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Perhaps one imagines that the 
tumultuous extremes of 1968 would have called for even more radical discussions about the mission of 
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criticism,” or what I earlier identified as the double sense of moral criticism Barnes 
offers (personal criticism of oneself and social-political criticism of institutions and 
others), is a capacity that “would be futile to search for in Latin America.” The reason 
for this view according to Paz’s thinking is that “we still have not learned how to 
think with true freedom. The fault is not intellectual but moral” (Paz 1972, 219).  
Historians of the period ignore the universal significance of Tlatelolco and the 
Mexican social protest movement of 1968. Robert Daniels, for instance, claims that 
“there was a striking common denominator to the upheavals of 1968, wherever they 
erupted…the target of rebellion was power—power over people and power over 
nations, power exercised on the international plane by great imperial states, by 
governments within nations, or by people in positions of dominance over the 
powerless under them, from the industrial bureaucracy to the university classroom” 
(Daniels 1989, 5). And yet, Daniels makes no mention of Tlatelolco, a fact eerily 
consistent with the circumstances of the time. “No newspaper in Mexico dared to 
print the number of deaths,” writes Paz, adding that “Here is the figure that the 
English newspaper The Guardian, after a careful investigation, considered the most 
probable: 325. Thousands must have been injured, thousands must have been 
arrested. The second of October, 1968, put an end to the student movement. It also 
ended an epoch in the history of Mexico” (Paz 1985, 235.)  Paz’s view is clearly 
conservative. In his essay ‘68, Paco Ignacio Taibo II writes,  
 
Over time, regrettably the second of October, with the tremendous power of our four 
hundred dead, many of them nameless corpses tossed from military airplanes into the 
Gulf of Mexico that same night, with the images of the wounded being dragged off by 
their hair, captured for posterity by the camera, with the memory of blood on the wet 
ground, with our retinas invaded and forever marked by the light of the two flares that 
started the massacre, with the stories of hospitals assailed by judicial-police officials 
intent on finishing off the wounded—regrettably, that day has been isolated (Taibo 2004, 
108). 
 
Thus one of the most damaging legacies any attempt at relating North American and 
Latin American philosophies of education to a pan-American model faces is the 
problem of obscurity, of forgotten memory. 
                                                                                                                                      
the liberal arts university than those provided by Barnes and Paz. In response to such criticism, we 
might ask: has the public need for an education based in ethics changed significantly for the 
generations that have emerged in the United States and Mexico since the late 1960s? No. I do not 
believe the normative expectations for the university educated has changed considerably since then; 
nor do I think that raising questions about the moral mission of the university is any less vital today 
than it was half a century ago. As evidence for what one might despairingly deem the everlasting crisis 
of education, even a cursory glance at the range of recent works dealing with the crisis of the modern 
university suggests that the relation between our personal system of values on the one hand, and the 
role that institutions can and should play in furthering our social and political values on the other, calls 
for not just reexamination but considerable reform. Education—including but certainly not limited to 
its parameters, relevance, cost, and, above all, its purpose—continues to be passionately and publicly 
contested. 
 
 
 
Comparative Philosophy 6.1 (2015)  KAISER ORTIZ 
53 
That Barnes and Paz offer original insights into the relationship between the 
mission of the university and the necessity of moral criticism can be seen by placing 
their contributions next to today’s more familiar Latin American exemplar in the 
philosophy of education. Paolo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed was published in 
Portuguese in 1968, the same year as the student butchery at Tlatelolco.3 Freire’s 
work was translated into English in 1970, the same year that Barnes’ The University 
as the New Church came into print.  Freire’s philosophy of education resonates 
deeply with Barnes and Paz. This is particularly evident in his focus on the dynamic 
processes involved in problem-posing as opposed to the banking-deposit view of 
education, and it is likewise evident in his declared need to emphasize the value of 
love across student-teacher relations. 
In conclusion, I want to elaborate on what I have argued is the threefold 
relationship (pyramid) of their affinity; viz., the centrality of values to a university 
education; the development of moral criticism through exposure to these values 
during one’s university education; and the relevance and importance of moral 
criticism (seen both as the paradox of distance and as an art of living) to all human 
beings. Stretched in a manner that recalls and reinvigorates the engaged social ideal 
of what Simone de Beauvoir called surpassing, or the moral dynamism that 
characterizes individual human beings acting towards an open and not a closed or 
predetermined future, these resemblances can be seen as guidelines or distance 
markers for protecting and promoting the conditions under which students learn how 
to think through and act upon the issues (values) that define one’s identity and place, 
socio-political relations, and lived experience. 
To return to the first guideline, Barnes and Paz maintain that any meaningful 
university education should be evaluated in terms of curriculum as well as lived 
experience. What students are taught and how they grow to think about what they 
have studied are equal tasks at the university level. Their view thus implies that a 
genuine education should be focused on the radical allowance or opening-up of moral 
practice, e.g., thinking through solutions to real world problems. Barnes invokes the 
phrase “open breathing space” to describe her wish that individuals have the room to 
work out their “personally created system of values” (Barnes 1970, 34). What their 
focus on values as the core of a university education shows is that student activism 
helps ensure the rehearsal of values so integral to the mission of the liberal arts 
university and hence so vital to a meaningful experience of higher learning. 
Second, the task of envisioning a future where moral criticism becomes the 
lifeblood of economic geographies and political communities reveals one practical 
application of the existentialist philosophies of education provided by Barnes and 
Paz. Granting that their ideas about what an education amounts to were an obvious 
starting point for them as each sought to locate the origins, pinpoint the aims, and 
discuss the values underlying moral criticism, their concerns were also focused on 
how values translate from individual persons to social bodies, and from the body 
politic back, once again, to selves in action. Their sense of moral dynamism across 
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generations might therefore be seen as the normative underpinning of the university 
mission in terms not only of cultivating a sense, on the personal level, of the 
importance of thinking through and having values, but of knowing how to put those 
values to use in terms of articulating and expressing moral criticism. It follows from 
this fluidity of identity that their educational views therefore also raise implications 
for an existentialist account of political socialization. 
Finally, that moral criticism of one’s own social and political realities is always 
checked, so to speak, by how we see our individual selves in terms of the actions we 
undertake as members of the same generation helps to prepare us for the inevitable 
conflict that characterizes difference within as well as between bodies, social groups, 
communities, and nations. What Barnes and Paz were attempting to accomplish 
through their purported philosophies of education was, I think, to make better sense 
of the challenges facing the emerging generation of social-political actors, artists, and 
democratic visionaries in order to encourage such reforms towards reinvigorated, 
more cohesive democratic institutions and practices. As Paz tells us in his 
characterization of the irresolvable contradiction of the university: “If the university 
were to disappear, so would the possibility of criticism; at the same time, its existence 
is a proof—and more, a guarantee—of the permanence of the object of criticism, that 
is, of what it wished would disappear” (Paz 1972, 223). In speaking to the production 
of an existentialist pan-American philosophy of education in the work of Barnes and 
Paz, then, it seems appropriate to say that the stage curtain remains open to the 
seasonal and generational audiences of students, teachers, and other social actors who 
attend the show only to find themselves already deeply a part of the production 
underway. 
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